

# INSTITUTIONAL REFORM OF INTERNATIONAL POLICY – ADVANCING THE DEBATE ON A WORLD ENVIRONMENT ORGANISATION

[Professor Udo E. Simonis](#)

Science Centre Berlin

Germany

## Background

Probably, no one would award international environmental policy the "best practice" label. Climatologists, for instance, expect average global temperature to increase by 5.8° up to 7° C – 2001 IPCC scenario – and sea levels to rise on average by up to 88cm in the 21st century; biologists estimate that between three and 130 plant and animal species die out every day; water experts anticipate rapidly increasing water scarcity, etc. (cf. Brown et al. 2000, Gleick 1993, Heywood/Watson 1995, IPCC 1996, 2001, Lyke/Fletcher 1992, Meyers 1993, UNEP 1999). In view of this imminent global environmental crisis, international environmental policy regimes have become a field on which the academic disciplines of international relations and development co-operation have focused their attention, not least with an eye to policy advice and management options.<sup>1</sup>

For some time now, claims have been heard in science and politics that real progress can be made here only through a more or less fundamental reform of the system of international institutions, in particular, by creating a new UN specialised agency concerned in essence, though not necessarily exclusively, with environmental problems. In 1998, in a policy paper, the Bonn-based Development and Peace Foundation spoke out in favour of a new UN organisation of this sort (Biermann and Simonis 1998, Biermann and Simonis 1999). The intent of the present contribution is to more precisely ground a respective proposal before the forum of political science and development co-operation.

A progress report on the issue of a global environment organisation would go beyond the space available here. One of the best-known initiatives in the Anglo-Saxon literature is that advanced by Daniel C. Esty, a specialist in international law, who in 1994, in *Greening the GATT*, proposed a global environment organisation, envisioned as a counterpole to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (Esty 1994a, b, 1996). Esty's type of organisation would be concerned, above all, with global environmental goods like the oceans and the atmosphere, and he seems intent on endowing this agency with far-reaching competences. The North-South compromise reached at the 1992 Rio de Janeiro conference – i.e. that environment and development are inseparable – would, for Esty, in fact tend more to decouple "environment" from "development." On Esty's initiative, a Global Environmental Governance Dialogue of experts was initiated and has met several times.

Meanwhile, many politicians and governments also see a new body as a potential solution. In 1999, Renato Ruggiero, the then Executive Director of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), caused a stir by calling for a World Environment Organisation as a counterbalance to the WTO (Ruggiero 1999) – an unlikely initiative coming from a top-level manager in view of the usual inclination of bureaucracies to widen their own competences when in doubt. No doubt, the debate on the need to integrate environmental standards into the WTO regime (Helm 1996, Biermann 1999) played a role here. But as early as 1998, the French President Jacques Chirac already joined the proponents of a world environment agency.<sup>2</sup>

Still, it is Germany that has been seen as the main international proponent of a new UN specialised agency, since Chancellor Kohl, in the mid-1990s, spoke out quite unexpectedly in favour of an "Environmental Security Council," a proposal that was followed in 1997 by the call for a "global umbrella organisation for environmental issues, with the United Nations Environment Programme as its major pillar",<sup>3</sup> and is now set to be further pursued by Germany's Red-Green government.<sup>4</sup> A statement made on January 25, 1999, by the environmental-policy spokeswoman of the SPD Bundestag faction included the following words:

"We need [...] to focus the tangled and disjointed international organisations and programmes. UNEP (UN Environment Programme, CSD (Commission on Sustainable Development), and UNDP (UN Development Programme) should be merged to form an organisation for sustainable development. Close links to the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organisation, and UNCTAD (UN Conference on Trade and Development) should be aimed for, as a means of preventing environmental dumping and achieving an environmentally sound, sustainable development in line with Agenda 21." (Quoted after: epd-Entwicklungspolitik 5/99).

This political development indicates that it is entirely conceivable that the near future will experience the launch of negotiations or at least exploratory talks on the establishment of a world environment organisation.<sup>5</sup> The past decades and years, which have seen the establishment of the UN Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO), the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and the International Criminal Court (ICC), have demonstrated that the international system is, despite its anarchic elements, capable of achieving progress in the task of further institutionalisation (for a comprehensive evaluation cf. Brandt-Report 1980, Damrosch 1987, Douglas 1987, Joint Inspection Unit 1995, Nyerere Report 1991, Palme Report 1989, Reisman 1993, Rosenau 1992, South Centre 1996, Tinbergen 1976, Touval 1994, and WCED 1987). The establishment of yet another UN specialised agency in charge of integrating existing programmes and organisations is a prospect by no means unrealistic. But, would an organisation of this type be desirable? Should political scientists call out to the government: "Stop!" or "Go on!"?

This question is interesting not only in practical but also in theoretical terms, in that it picks up on some significant problems with which the

disciplines of international relations and development co-operation have been concerned with for decades (cf. CDP 1989, Hardin 1968, Kaul et al. 1999, Miller 1990, Postiglione 1999, Rosenau/Czempiel 1992, Rest 1994, Streeten 1989, Streeten et al. 1992). What is at issue are basic questions of international institutionalisation that are exemplified in the dispute over the need for a global environmental organisation – and the shape it ought to be given. In essence, what we find here are three different, somewhat opposed positions that need to be discussed in what follows:

- Hierarchisation of international environmental policy/government. This position states that we would need a hierarchical organisation of environmental policy, which might be achieved through a sovereignty-impairing world environment organisation or an "environmental security council."
- Horizontal institutionalisation – governance – with or without the establishment of a world environment organisation as a new element. What these two positions have in common is that they reject, or regard as unrealistic, any hierarchisation of the international institutional structure in the sphere of environmental policy, though they are at odds on whether or not the process of horizontal institutionalisation – governance – could and should be fostered by establishing a non-sovereignty-impairing UN specialised organisation. The present article supports the latter position.

The article also outlines the final shape that might be given to such a non-sovereignty-impairing UN specialised organisation, which, because of the development-related component envisaged for it, we would wish to call the "World Environment and Development Organisation (WEDO)."

### **World Environment Organisation versus Environmental Security Council**

Many representatives of non-governmental environmental organisations (NGOs) have been complaining for years that international environmental policy lacks clout. The main world environmental problem is, they say, the lack or faulty implementation of environmental standards set out in international treaties and conference documents. In essence, this is a correct statement. But often the right evidence is adduced to draw the wrong conclusions, and calls are made for unrealistic surges of institutionalisation, say, a "World Environment Organisation" with a hierarchical organisational pattern and the power to impose sanctions on individual states, thus curtailing, to a certain degree, the sovereignty of all states. Such proposals give preference to the aspect of global government over horizontal, non-hierarchical organisational patterns/governance.

In the theoretical debate this has often been termed undesirable – both by adherents of neorealism, who regard every form of institutionalisation as unrealistic or unlikely (e.g. Waltz 1959, 1979), and by proponents of neoliberal institutionalism, who point to the possibility of governing in the international system on the basis of networked problem-specific regimes and not through sovereignty-impairing organisations (e.g. Haas et al. 1993, Victor et al. 1998, Young 1997). In essence, the call for a hierarchical organisation of international environmental policy refers back to earlier idealistic notions centred on the chances and conditions of "world federalism."

In the meantime, however, experience with international environmental policy indicates that, at least in this field, any sovereignty-impairing hierarchy would run up against strong resistance, in the North and South alike. True, about twelve years ago, as the climate debate was getting underway, some 24 countries spoke out in favour of a new authority for the protection of the atmosphere that would "involve such decision-making procedures as may be effective even if, on occasion, unanimous agreement has not been achieved." (The Hague Declaration 1989) Such an authority was to have the power to impose sanctions against individual states or a minority of states (cf. Sands 1989). Even though some larger countries were involved – including Brazil, Canada, Germany, India, and Japan – of the permanent members of the UN Security Council only France was willing to sign the Hague Declaration. Today, it appears unlikely that developing countries like China or industrialised countries like the USA would be prepared to accept any impairment of their sovereignty in matters of environmental protection.

One may regard as equally unrealistic the proposal on an "Environmental Security Council" (cf. Palmer 1992),<sup>6</sup> which the former German chancellor Kohl once mentioned, though without permitting it to develop into an official position. By contrast, the proposal to establish an "International Environmental Court" with binding jurisdiction (Fues 1997, Postiglione 1999, Rest 1994, Zaelke/Cameron 1990) meanwhile has become a realistic proposal, as many of the contributions to this book indicate. The former proposal would require at least an amendment of the UN Charter, which in turn would require ratification by two thirds of UN members as well as by the permanent members of the UN Security Council. It seems that any extensive restrictions of national sovereignty are difficult, or even impossible, in view of the need for a quorum of this sort.

There are also calls to strengthen the sanctioning options of existing international institutions, precisely with an eye to a world environment organisation. Some see the WTO as a model since, under its rules, individual countries can accuse other countries of violating the GATT – or other trade agreements – and force them to appear before a dispute-settlement panel of independent trade experts, which de facto takes binding decisions (cf. Bhaskar/Glyn 1995, Brenton 1994, Hoffman 1989, and Kenen 1994). But a procedure of this kind would be more than difficult to transfer to a world environment organisation.

In the first place, there are technical reasons for not doing so. The parties to the WTO – the nation states – are, in general, parties to the same trade agreements, which would not necessarily be the case with membership in a world environment organisation. True, it would be possible to make membership in a world environment organisation conditional on ratification of a catalogue of given international environmental agreements. But it is doubtful that any such organisation would provide incentive enough to ratify an environmental treaty that a country would otherwise not have ratified.

In the second place, effective dispute settlement in trade law resists comparison with the case of environmental law. Trade conflicts concern

concrete, more or less transparent, and universally measurable legal acts of a government – be it the level of tariffs, import and export regulations, or technical standards for domestic manufacturing facilities. The GATT/WTO dispute-settlement panels are designed to prevent one country from creatively shaping its trade regulations with an eye to deriving unwarranted benefits at the expense of other countries. Even though environment-related conflicts over the appropriateness of legal acts may occur, the problem posed by the global environmental crisis is in fact far more complex in terms of its causes and consequences.

Many international environmental agreements entail no transparent, concrete obligations on states that could be as easily quantified as an export tariff. And even where there are measurable indicators, the subordinate priority given to the environment on the domestic policy agenda of most countries casts doubts on their willingness to implement decisions of dispute-settlement panels. Equipping a future world environment organisation with powerful enforcement mechanisms, therefore, would prove practicable only vis-à-vis those countries that even today see themselves faced with the threat of "eco-imperialism": i.e., the developing countries (see Agarwal/Narain 1991, Miller 1995, Sachs 1993). It is precisely with regard to developing countries that a world environment organisation with "sharp teeth" could prove counterproductive. In order to dodge the environmental enforcement pressure of industrialised countries, developing countries would either refrain from joining or fight to water down given environmental standards and refuse to accept any more stringent standards. This, of course, would be no great service to the environment.

### **Horizontal institutionalisation/governance with or without a new world organisation as an additional element**

As indicated above, a hierarchy of international environmental policy in the form of a sovereignty-impairing world environment organisation seems rather unrealistic. Effective international environmental policy seems possible only via horizontal institutionalisation. Still, the question is whether the existing governance structures of environmental policy should remain the way they are or whether there is need to widen them to include a new non-sovereignty-impairing world environment organisation – perhaps along the lines of the World Health Organisation (WHO). In what follows, this issue is being discussed with reference to three essential functions of international environmental policy that are not adequately performed by the existing governance structures:

- co-ordination of the increasingly fragmented international institutional system
- the system's capacity-building and financial functions
- implementation and further development of international environmental law –concern-building, improving the contractual basis<sup>7</sup>

#### *Better co-ordination of the international institutional system*

The international institutional system displays, first and foremost, shortcomings in co-ordination leading to substantial costs and sub-optimal policy results (cf. Brown et al. 2000, Brown-Weiss 1989, Commission on Global Governance 1995, IPCC 1996, Jaenicke et al. 1996, Keohane/Levy 1996, and Ostrom 1991). UNEP, founded in 1972, was for a time a comparatively autonomous actor with clearly defined functions. The proliferation of international environmental agreements, however, led to an extensive fragmentation of the system, particularly in that newly created convention secretariats have, in part for political reasons, not been integrated into UNEP. This set the stage for an unfolding of strong particularist interests, which has not favoured a co-ordinated approach to international environmental policy. For instance, there is very little co-ordination between climate, biodiversity, and desertification policy (WBGU 1996). Independent secretariats and advisory boards have been set up for each of these fields, which has led to de facto specialised agencies, each with its own agenda.

The funding of the new environmental conventions with North-South relevance has partly been integrated into the World Bank in the form of the Global Environment Facility (GEF), and partly transferred to independent sectoral funds (Biermann 1998, Biermann/Simonis 1999). In addition, various UN specialised agencies – like WHO and FAO – have become active in the field of environmental protection, while UNEP, an organisation of 450 officers and, in 2000, of a 60 million \$US annual budget, has been unable to develop a really effective standard-setting and programme-building force of its own.

This problem has long been recognised and attempts have been made to network individual organisations, programmes, and offices since 1972, when a first co-ordination board was set up within the United Nations.<sup>8</sup> This board and its successors, however, failed to overcome the particularist interests of individual departments, programmes, and convention secretariats, and the result has been a fragmentation of the international institutional system that has rendered it comparatively ineffective and inefficient. The ongoing debate since the 1992 Rio conference on institutional reform led to one more sub-commission of the UN Economic and Social Council, the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD). Beside UNEP, the convention secretariats, and the relevant UN specialised agencies, the CSD has developed into a forum for discourse, but not one in which decisions are taken. It has proven not to be adequate to the cross-sectoral functions that many had foreseen for it. Its representatives include ministers responsible for development and the environment, but not their colleagues with the portfolios for financial, economic, and foreign affairs.

In short, in the field of environmental policy the international institutional system has, since 1972, been marked by a high level of organisational fragmentation. This system lacks a focal point of the kind defined by, say, the World Health Organisation (WHO) or the World Trade Organisation (WTO). There are overlaps in the functions and duties of nearly all of these institutions. Co-ordination – if there is any – is an ad hoc affair, with individual signatory conferences meeting with UN organisations or among themselves to hammer out arrangements on co-ordination and co-operation.

For this reason, there appears to be an urgent need for an institutional centre in charge of an international sustainability strategy. Just as, in the 1970s and 1980s, autonomous environment ministries were established at the national level with an eye to strengthening environmental protection, the goal now should be to further institutionalise the field of international environmental policy by setting up an independent specialised organisation with a view to minimising the particularist interests of individual programmes and offices and limiting double work, overlaps, and inconsistencies. It would appear both practicable and simple in organisational terms to set up an independent UN specialised organisation with a legal personality, a budget, and funding sources of its own, a development which would have to be accompanied by: (a) the dissolution and transfer of UNEP, CSD, and GEF; (b) an integration of the larger convention secretariats; and (c) a redefinition of the functions of the remaining environmental and developmental organisations, programmes, and offices.

#### *Capacity-building in the South – financial and technology transfers*

Several years ago the term capacity-building became a new catchword of development co-operation (AGENDA 21 1992, Jaenicke et al. 1996). Seen in empirical terms, the building of capacity, particularly in developing countries, is apt to be one of the essential functions of environmental regimes as well (cf. Friedheim 1999, Keohane 1984, Keohane et al. 1993, Korton 1990, Krasner 1983, and Wagner 1997). Financial and technical co-operation in environmental problems, nevertheless, differs from traditional development co-operation: in particular the transfers effected by the Multilateral Ozone Fund (MOF) or the Global Environment Facility (GEF) serve not only to build environmental capacities in the South, but also provide compensation for the full "agreed" incremental costs incurred by developing countries in connection with global environmental policy – in accordance with the principle of the 1992 Rio conference on "common but differentiated responsibilities and capabilities" of the parties (see Biermann/Simonis 1999, Sand 1994, WBGU 1999.). In this context, Hans Peter Schipulle, division head of the German Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development, noted:

"Unlike classical development aid [...], these transfers, effected by environmental conventions, are obligations that are binding under international law [...]. If these obligations are not met by the industrialised countries, the developing countries can advance this as grounds for not meeting their own obligations, which in turn would harm the interests of the international community, i.e. including the industrialised countries. [These stipulations] become national law when the Convention is ratified and thus constitutes a new legal frame of reference for the co-operation with developing countries." (Schipulle 1997: 236f.; own translation).

This new frame of reference is mirrored in the parity-based North-South decision-making procedure of the GEF and the MOF, as well as in the fact that the otherwise customary donor-recipient terminology has given way to the notion of "partnership." However, even here, the international institutional system suffers from an ad hoc approach that fails to live up to the standards of transparency, effectiveness, and participation of those affected, and the need for financial and technology transfers from North to South. This is why industrialised countries have agreed to refund developing countries for their incremental costs not only in ozone policy but also in climate policy, if the latter commit themselves to quantitative emission-reduction targets for greenhouse gases in the coming decades. There is a similar arrangement in the making for the future costs of biodiversity policy in the South (Biermann 1998: Chapters 5-7), and also for the transfers aimed at combating desertification as well as the anticipated transfer obligations aimed at limiting releases of persistent organic pollutants (POPs). Moreover, the future international trade in emission certificates in connection with climate protection (Simonis 1996b) – perhaps initially in the form of the "Clean Development Mechanism" (CDM) decided on in Kyoto in 1997 – will require solid institutional underpinning.

These new and extended functional requirements of the international institutional system can, however, not be met by the present institutional setting.

One conceivable approach would be the proliferation of further special funds like the Multilateral Ozone Fund, which was set up in 1990 specifically for this one environmental problem (cf. Benedick 1998). But any such further fragmentation of the institutional system would appear counterproductive and should therefore be avoided (cf. Sand 1994).

A second approach would be to transfer all these tasks of global environmental protection to the World Bank. This the developing countries would, in all likelihood, resist, since they regard the World Bank, with its contribution-dependent decision-making procedure, as heavily dominated by the North.

A third approach would be to transfer the task of improving the capacity-building, funding, and compensation functions of the international institutional system through an independent organisation that pays more attention to the special needs of international environmental policy than does the World Bank and is at the same time capable of overcoming the system's fragmentation. This proposal might well find the acceptance of the industrialised countries if the new organisation were provided with a decision-making procedure that is in fact equivalent to that of the GEF.

As far as funding is concerned, a new world organisation would also offer the possibility to fundamentally revamp the international system, viz. to introduce "quasi-automatic funding mechanisms." Nearly all funding mechanisms that have been used to date suffer from the voluntary nature of contributions, and even in cases in which there are contractually fixed membership contributions, payments often are politically instrumentalised or made conditional on the given economic situation. As the theory of collective goods indicates, the funding of community tasks is systematically undercut by free riders, and in consequence at the national level community tasks are not funded on a voluntary basis but financed through taxes.<sup>9</sup> This is the point of departure of the ongoing debate on quasi-automatic funding mechanisms in international environmental policy.

The financial needs of environmental policy are obviously substantial. The secretariat of the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and

Development estimated that the conference's action programme, Agenda 21, which was worked out by mutual consent of the parties to the conference would require a total annual volume of 125 billion US\$ in financial aid to the developing countries, a volume in dimensions higher than the current two-billion budget of the GEF, through which the industrialised countries transfer their support for climate, biodiversity, and marine-protection policies in the South.

Since early on in the debate, international taxes on environmentally harmful activities have been discussed as regards ozone policy – CFC tax – and climate policy – carbon tax. At present, the debate revolves around the Tobin tax on foreign-exchange transactions, as well as an international charge on air traffic. The latter possibility had been addressed by former UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali in the Agenda for Peace, as a means of funding peacekeeping activities (UNSG 1992). Since collecting an international charge on air traffic would not entail undue verification costs – it could, for instance, be collected together with the customary airport tax – it would appear practicable. A comparatively low tax rate may ensure that it would not result in any major distortions of competition and rerouting or relocation of air traffic.

An additional source of funding might be sought in a rededication of debt instruments from developing countries for use by the new organisation – a global debt-for-nature swap, as it were – as well as a dedicated use of the revenues from the planned trade in emission certificates provided for in the Kyoto Protocol.

Of course, such quasi-automatic funding mechanisms could also be introduced without any global environment organisation, just as it would be possible to establish a global organisation without endowing it with automatic funding mechanisms. Still, the one is inseparably linked to the other: quasi-automatic funding mechanisms require an appropriate institutional structure, and it is precisely in the case of environment-related taxes that a UN organisation would be an actor particularly well suited to the task of a fair collection and administration of the funds. By the same token, quasi-automatic funding mechanisms would provide the new organisation with the means it needs to discharge its tasks, in particular capacity-building in developing countries.

#### *Implementation and further development of international environmental law*

As discussed above, it might be a mistake to think in terms of equipping a world environment and development organisation with strong enforcement mechanisms – for the case of an International Court of the Environment, however, see the other contributions to this volume. Instead, the organisation should have softer enforcement mechanisms, particularly the right to collect, evaluate, and publish in a suitable form information on the state of the environment and on the state of environmental policy in the UN member states, especially with regard to the international commitments assumed by individual states. As Marc A. Levy (1993) showed with reference to the European clean-air regime, transparent and comparative information on individual countries – the "leaders" – can give rise to important political initiatives in less environmentally-minded countries – the "laggards."

Like most other specialised agencies of the United Nations, a world environment organisation should therefore foster problem consciousness and seek to improve the state of the world's knowledge, including information on the earth system as well as information on the state of implementation of international and national policy with a view to controlling global change (see Schellnhuber/Wenzel 1998). Of course, it is not necessary to reinvent the wheel: all recent environmental conventions have obliged the parties to report regularly on their policy-related activities. Specialised organisations like the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO), the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), or the World Health Organisation (WHO) collect and disseminate valuable information and promote further research; the CSD provides important contributions in designing indicators of sustainable development. And UNEP, not least, is active in many of these areas.

Yet, what we still lack is a comprehensive co-ordination, focusing, and decision oriented processing of this knowledge. The data and programmes currently developed by various international actors need a fixed point in the institutional system. In theory, UNEP could be this fixed point, but the present resources and competences of this programme, which operates under the UN General Assembly, are not adequate. This would be more a task for a world environment organisation endowed with sufficient funds and independent in institutional terms.

Such an organisation would also have more possibilities to support regime-building processes ("improving the contractual basis"; see Keohane et al. 1993), particularly by initiating and preparing international treaties. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) might serve as a model here. Using a predefined procedure, it has worked out a body of "ILO conventions" which constitute a kind of global labour code. Compared with the ILO, however, environmental policy is, in terms of regime formation, far more disparate and marked by competence-related disputes between various UN specialised agencies in which UNEP has been unable to hold its own.

#### **Outline of a World Environment and Development Organisation**

Establishing a non-sovereignty-impairing world environment organisation as an added element of a horizontally organised governance structure in environmental policy would thus appear to be a promising endeavour. An organisation of this sort could be set up – independently of UN quorums – at a diplomatic conference and come into force for its members only. In legal terms it could even become active without China – as the WTO did – or without the USA – which has pulled out of several specialised UN organisations.

In essence, the new organisation should fulfil the three previously mentioned functions, i.e. integrate and better co-ordinate international environmental policy; build and finance capacities in the developing countries; and, contribute to a better implementation and further development of international environmental law. But what concrete shape could, should be given to such an organisation? Here, some light needs to be thrown

on the following three problems: (a) the demarcation of "environment" and "development;" (b) the decision-making procedure; and (c) the integration of private actors.

### *Demarcation of "environment" and "development"*

As was said above, the main reason why a new UN specialised organisation appears to be needed is the dysfunctional fragmentation of the international institutional system in the field of environmental policy. This is where the focal point of its functions should lie. But, internationally, it is important not to view environmental protection in isolation. Political agreements and programmes, for instance, on regulating the consumption of fossil fuels – the Climate Convention – or protecting tropical forests – the Biodiversity Convention – inevitably affect core economic and development related issues. A world environment organisation must take this into account. It need not foster development as such, as is attempted by the UN Development Programme (UNDP), but it must not run counter to development, either. Its policy should ensure that poverty alleviation and economic development in the South are not jeopardised and that international environmental policy gets in line with the criterion of a globally equitable burden-sharing. This is why it is essential that this – as in the case of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development – should be fully reflected in the organisation's name: "World Environment and Development Organisation (WEDO)."

Some might ask for a higher level of integration. The amalgamation of UNEP and UNDP – which, in view of UNEP's small and UNDP's large budget, would amount to a mammoth union in the family of international institutions. Most industrialised countries have long been opposed to any international organisation for development issues. On the other hand, many industrialised countries might come to like a UNDP-UNEP synthesis, if this proved to be a way to cut the UN's overall development-related budget expenditures, i.e. if amalgamation means savings. The former UNDP administrator, James Gustave Speth, called in principle for a world environment organisation, though he spoke out against any amalgamation with his own organisation (Speth 1996, 1998).<sup>10</sup> One main problem is the project character of UNDP's work which is different from UNEP's structure. Another factor is the substantial size difference between UNEP and UNDP. Both aspects might well hobble the policy-stimulating and co-operation-fostering effects of a new organisation.

Still, even if it were, at present, wiser to refrain from amalgamating UNEP and UNDP to form the new organisation, it would all the same be necessary to add the term development to the title of the new organisation. The double, integrative term "environment and development" picks up on the 1992 Rio conference and the Rio Declaration, illustrating that environmental policy implies no structural restraints on the economic development of the South.

This in turn would imply inclusion of a number of principles of international environmental policy, such as the "common but differentiated responsibilities and capabilities" of the parties, the principle of obligations differentiated between North and South, and the principle of compensation for the South's incremental environmental costs. So even if a pure "World Environment Organisation" would at present be rejected by most of the developing countries, the proposal for a "World Environment and Development Organisation" might, hopefully, open the door to a compromise between North and South.

### *Decision-making procedure*

Institutions, in general, lower the transaction costs of the international system by providing proven and reliable decision-making procedures (Keohane 1984). A World Environment and Development Organisation could thus contribute to coming to terms with the power configurations specific to environmental policy by establishing a unique decision-making process which would, independently of individual regimes, initiate and co-ordinate an international sustainability strategy of North and South. Even though consensus is gaining ground in day-to-day UN affairs, the actual structure of voting rights in committees and commissions is still essential. In many international organisations, special tasks and problems have led to rather specific decision-making procedures. Various elements of these different procedures could uniquely be combined for a World Environment and Development Organisation in order to ensure its overall effectiveness and acceptance.

Decision-making procedures that provide the North and South with equal rights would certainly be appropriate. This could prove to be a means of ensuring that the decisions taken by the new world organisation on its strategy and programme are compatible with the interests of both the developing and the industrialised countries. Decision-making procedures based on North-South parity are, in essence, a "third way" between the South-oriented decision-making procedure of the UN General Assembly – one country, one vote – and the North-oriented procedure of the Bretton Woods institutions – one dollar, one vote.

As early as 1990, it was stipulated for the ozone regime and the Multilateral Ozone Fund (MOF) that every decision ratified should require a two-thirds vote of the parties, including a simple majority of both the developing countries and the industrialised countries (Benedick 1998). The procedure adopted for the reformed Global Environment Facility (GEF) in 1994 is in effect similar.<sup>11</sup>

One tricky aspect of strictly parity-based procedures, however, is the definition of group association. Singapore, for instance, has a higher per capita income than many industrialised countries, though it – as a member of the "Group of 77" – continues to be regarded as a developing country. The ozone regime is marked by a problem-specific graduation procedure: If a developing country consumes more than 300gr of CFCs per capita and annum, it is classified as an industrialised country. It is then required to meet the North's stricter reduction criteria and is included in the group of industrialised countries in parity-based votes (Biermann 1998). A case-specific graduation of this kind would, however, not seem to be appropriate for a World Environment and Development Organisation which is to be responsible for a whole complex of environmental problems. A second-best option would be the self-definition of the parties, as in the case of UNCTAD or the UN General Assembly; developing countries

that join the OECD, as did Mexico and South-Korea a few years ago, are expected to comply with the environmental obligations of industrialised countries.

In addition, we need to consider to what extent a parity-based North-South procedure could be broken down into a multiple-parity procedure. If, for instance, four groups – industrialised countries with a temporary subgroup of countries in transition, newly industrial countries, developing countries and least developed countries – were formed, it would be practicable to base decisions of the World Environment and Development Organisation on consent of the majority of the members of these four groups.

### *Integration of private actors*

The ongoing discussion on global governance, both public and in the social sciences, has focused on the new role of non-governmental actors, on civil society and, in the present context, on transnational environmental and business organisations (e.g. Anheier/Salamon 1998, Union of International Associations 1999, Wapner 1997, Werksman 1996). These NGOs not only exert considerable pressure on politics, they also offer a number of "services" in the international system: they may supply favourably priced research and policy advice by qualified and privately funded staff members, monitor the mutual obligations of countries in a way that would be impossible for government agencies due to the ban on intervention under international law, and they do inform governments and the public on international negotiations, both on the activities of "one's own" diplomats and on those of the other negotiating parties. In addition, transnational environmental and business organisations can constitute effective feedback mechanisms between government representatives at diplomatic conferences and the situation at home (Raustiala 1997). For these reasons it is widely accepted that NGOs should be granted a greater say in international negotiations and policy formulation.

However, there are two troublesome areas that encumber the international community of private actors. On the one hand, the private environment groups active at UN conferences and signatory conferences are dominated by organisations of the North, from which they obtain their funding and, for the most part, their personnel (for a critical view, see South Centre 1996: 212ff.). This may influence the agendas of these groups, even though attempts are often made to maintain modes of North-South parity in the internal co-ordination between transnational environmental and developmental organisations. When the hearing rights of such organisations at diplomatic conferences are at issue, it is mostly the governments of the developing countries that prevent any further-reaching rights for private actors – in part due to internal democracy deficits. A second problem is that the financial power of the business organisations may decisively dilute genuine environmental interests.

One possible solution to these problems would be to institutionalise the collaboration of private actors in such a way as to ensure that the votes of North and South and business and environmental interests are balanced. A precedent here is the decision-making procedure of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) which accords four votes to every member state, two to the government and one each to the business associations and the labour unions. The environmental and developmental organisations from the South would accordingly have a voting majority in the new organisation – keyed to the size of the population they represent – and the interests of industry and the environment would be equally represented.

Certain problems could emerge in transferring this procedure to the new organisation, however. In environmental and developmental affairs there are few organisations that fully represent their overall national clientele. But effective coalitions – like, for instance, the German Forum Environment and Development – could very well emerge in the near future; indeed, this could be promoted by anchoring a representation of voting NGOs from both camps in the statute of the new World Environment and Development Organisation.

### **Conclusions**

If we are to achieve an international environmental and developmental policy capable of ensuring sustainability in and for the 21<sup>st</sup> century, it will be necessary to widen the family of UN specialised organisations and to include a new member responsible for the policy field of sustainable development. Disparate, poorly co-ordinated units in the existing international institutional system could in this way be fused and on the whole invigorated.

As proposed above, the UN Environment Programme, the UN Commission for Sustainable Development, the Global Environment Facility, the secretariats of the major environmental conventions – climate, biodiversity, desertification convention and the law of the seas – and the UN Development Programme should be amalgamated in a new organisation, the World Environment and Development Organisation. Such an organisation could lend the urgent tasks of environmental and developmental policy more weight among national governments, international organisations, and private actors alike. This would also make it possible to strengthen the action capacity of the developing countries through enlarged financial and technical support. Furthermore, this would enable the international community to improve the institutional setting for negotiating new agreements and action programmes, and for implementing existing ones.

A World Environment and Development Organisation could, on the one hand, be funded through contributions from the industrialised countries, and the savings effected by integrating existing programmes and convention secretariats into it. A second approach to funding would be to rededicate debt instruments of the developing countries for the purposes of the new organisation – enlarged debt-for-sustainable-development swaps. A third and major approach would be to introduce quasi-automatic funding mechanisms, above all a Tobin tax on cross-border financial transactions and/or an international air-traffic charge, and to harness – parts of – the revenues stemming from the planned trade in emission certificates in international climate policy.

As regards decision-making, the World Environment and Development Organisation could gain the largest possible acceptance by introducing a

parity-based North-South decision-making procedure conceived along the lines of the Multilateral Ozone Fund (MOF) and the reformed Global Environment Facility (GEF). This would mean that both a majority of the developing countries and a majority of the industrialised countries would have a group veto on decisions. Furthermore, the growing influence of private actors in global governance should be institutionalised in the organisation, in this way improving equal opportunity. One may, therefore, propose voting rights for representatives of environment and business organisations on the model of the ILO. In this way, every country would have four votes: two for the government, one for environmental and developmental organisations, and one for business associations.

No doubt, an organisation of this sort will seem unrealistic or untimely to many people. But the establishment of an International Criminal Court (ICC) also appeared unrealistic just ten years ago. In the present article arguments were put forward that do justify the need for a World Environment and Development Organisation. At least some of the industrialised countries like France, Germany, and Japan now appear to embrace a positive attitude toward a new UN specialised organisation. Thus far, the developing countries tend to be either silent or more or less sceptical. But the organisation outlined here could soon prove acceptable for a larger group of countries. Representatives of the South may ask whether a World Environment and Development Organisation should be preferred or whether a global environment organisation of Daniel Esty's type would turn out to be more suitable. The present author, of course, is inclined to believe that the proposal advanced here has the best chance to be implemented.

### References

1. It will not be feasible to provide a comprehensive overview of the literature here; see the literature reports in Elliot (1998), Werksman (1996), Young (1997), and, to single out a few for the German-speaking world, Biermann (1998), Gehring (1994), Rittberger (1993), and Simonis (1996a).
2. On November 3, 1998, President Chirac, at a congress of the World Conservation Union, spoke of the need for a "world authority" as an "impartial and indisputable global centre for the evaluation of our environment" (Chirac 1998).
3. Chancellor Kohl's statement before the 1997 special session of the UN General Assembly - the "Rio-plus-five Summit" - included the following words: "[...] global environmental protection and sustainable development need a clearly audible voice at the United Nations. Therefore, in the short term, it is important that co-operation among the various environment organisations be significantly improved. In the medium term this should lead to the creation of a global umbrella organisation for environmental issues, with the United Nations Environment Programme as a major pillar" (Deutschland 1997). This was in effect in line with the Joint Declaration of Brazil, Germany, Singapore, and South Africa of June 23, 1997, at the same session of the UN General Assembly.
4. The German Advisory Council on Global Change in 1996 likewise recommended an "organisation for sustainable development," but without, at this juncture, spelling out any specifics (WBGU 1996).
5. On the state of the internal UN reform debate, see UNSG (1998). The UN Task Force on Environment and Human Settlements recommended setting up an "Environmental Management Group" under the direction of UNEP as a means of better co-ordinating the work of secretariats, departments, and agencies.
6. Toward the end of the 1980s New Zealand proposed the establishment of an "Environmental Protection Council" that was likewise to be empowered to take binding decisions (General Debate Statement at the 44<sup>th</sup> Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 2<sup>nd</sup> October 1989; Statement of the Honourable Geoffrey Palmer, Prime Minister of New Zealand).
7. See Haas/Keohane/Levy (1993) on the three "c's" of successful environmental regimes. A fourth "c" to this model may be added: compliance management. This last function would, however, continue to be the task of the individual environmental institutions even after the establishment of a world environment organisation, since a centralised compliance management appears unrealistic in view of the great number of regimes with different parties.
8. Following the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, an independent office, the "Environment Co-ordination Board," was created; it was disbanded in 1977. Since then the UN's environmental policy has been co-ordinated by the general Administrative Committee on Co-ordination (ACC) and in part by UNEP. Klaus Topfer, UNEP's current executive director, now seems to intend to set up an "Environmental Management Group" under the direction of UNEP with an eye to being better able to co-ordinate the work of the secretariats, departments, and agencies.
9. See also the report of "The Independent Working Group on the Future of the United Nations," headed by former Pakistani prime minister Moeen Qureshi and former German president Richard von Weizsaecker (1995).
10. "I think it is very timely to be thinking about how to strengthen the UN in both environment and development, and linking the two. Major institutional innovations are needed in the environmental area, but perhaps the most important is to dramatically strengthen the UN Environment Programme. My own view is that UNEP should evolve into a world environment organisation. I think a new name might be useful, because it would symbolise the fact that something new had come into being. The organisation which I think is needed is one that would deal with information, analysis, monitoring trends in environment, early warning, framing agreements and building consensus for action. So we need a World Organisation for Environment that is as strong and as effective as the World Trade Organisation, where the trade ministers work together

internationally, or as the World Health Organisation, where the health ministers work together. We need an organisation that brings all the environmental ministers of the world together for concerted action. I hope that UNEP can evolve into a world environment institution of the type that I described." (Speth 1998)

11. Since 1994 decisions of the GEF Administrative Council have required a two-thirds majority that must be made up of 60 percent of the countries participating in the facility and 60 percent of the financial contributions to the facility. This is in effect a procedure based on North-South parity, one that accords an effective veto to developing countries and industrialised countries alike.

#### **Literature cited**

1. Agarwal A. and Narain S. (1991) *Global Warming in an Unequal World. A Case of Environmental Colonialism*. Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi.
2. Agenda 21. Programme of Action for Sustainable Development. United Nations 1992, New York.
3. Anheier H.K. and Salamon L.M. (1998) *The Nonprofit Sector in the Developing World*. New York, Manchester University Press.
4. Benedick R.E. (1998) *Ozone Diplomacy. New Directions in Safeguarding the Planet*. 2<sup>nd</sup> Enlarged Edition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.
5. Bhaskar V. and Glyn A. eds. (1995) *The North, the South and the Environment. Ecological Constraints and the Global Economy*. Earthscan, London.
6. Biermann F. (1998) *Weltumweltpolitik zwischen Nord und Sud. Die neue Verhandlungsmacht der Entwicklungslaender*. Nomos, Baden-Baden.
7. Biermann F. and Simonis U.E. (1998) *A World Environment and Development Organisation. Functions, Opportunities, Issues*. Policy Paper No. 9. Development and Peace Foundation, Bonn.
8. Biermann F. and Simonis U.E. (1999) *Pleading for a World Environment and Development Organisation*. In: Vlavianos-Arvanitis A. ed. *Biopolitics - The Bio-Environment Vol. VII. The Budapest Sessions*. Biopolitics International Organisation, Athens, pp. 51-67
9. Biermann F. and Simonis U.E. (1999) *The Multilateral Ozone Fund. A Case Study on Institutional Learning*. *International Journal of Social Economics* 26(1-3), 239-273.
10. Brenton T. (1994) *The Greening of Machiavelli. The Evolution of International Environmental Politics*. Earthscan, London.
11. Brown L. et al. (2000) *State of the World 2000*, New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
12. Brown-Weiss, E. (1989) *In Fairness to Future Generations. International Law, Common Patrimony, and Intergenerational Equity*. UN University Press, Tokyo.
13. Chirac J. (1998) *Speech by President Jacques Chirac, at the Congress of the World Conservation Union*. 3rd November, Fontainebleau.
14. Commission on Global Governance (1995) *Our Global Neighbourhood*. Oxford University Press, New York, Oxford.
15. Committee for Development Planning - CDP (1989) *Elements of an International Development Strategy for the 1990s*. United Nations, New York.
16. Douglas W. (1987) *The Specialised Agencies and the United Nations. The System in Crisis*. Hurst, London.
17. Damrosch L.F. (1987) *The International Court of Justice at a Crossroads*. Transnational Publishers, Inc., New York.
18. Elliot L. (1998) *The Global Politics of the Environment*, Houndmills. Macmillan Press, Basingstoke.
19. Esty D.C. (1994a) *Greening the GATT. Trade, Environment and the Future*. Longman London.
20. Esty D.C. (1994b) *The Case for a Global Environmental Organisation*. In *Managing the World Economy. Fifty Years after Bretton Woods*, ed. P. B. Kenen, pp. 287-309.
21. Esty D.C. (1996) *Stepping up to the Global Environmental Challenge*. *Fordham Environmental Law Journal* 7(1), 103-113.
22. Friedheim R.L. (1999) *Negotiating the New Ocean Regime*, Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
23. Fues T. (1997) *Rio plus 10. The German Contribution to a Global Strategy for Sustainable Development*, Policy Paper No. 6, Bonn:

Development and Peace Foundation.

24. Gehring T. (1994) *Dynamic International Regimes. Institutions for International Environmental Governance*. Campus, Frankfurt a. M.
25. German Advisory Council on Global Change [WBGU] (1996) *World in Transition. Ways Towards Global Environmental Solutions. Annual Report 1995*. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, New York.
26. German Advisory Council on Global Change [WBGU] (1999) *World in Transition. Ways Towards Sustainable Managing of Freshwater Resources. Annual Report 1997*. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, New York.
27. Gleick P.H. ed. (1993) *Water in Crisis. A Guide to the World's Fresh Water Resources*. Oxford University Press, New York, Oxford.
28. *Global Environmental Governance Dialogue (1999) Global Environmental Governance Dialogue. An Invitation*, Organiser: Daniel C. Esty.
29. Haas P.M., Keohane R.O. and Levy M.A. eds. (1993) *Institutions for the Earth. Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.
30. *Hague Declaration (1989) Declaration of the Hague, March 11th. 1989; reproduced in International Legal Materials 1308*.
31. Hardin G. (1968) *The Tragedy of the Commons*. *Science* 162, 1243-1248.
32. Helm C. (1996) *Transboundary Environmental Problems and Trade Rules*. *International Journal of Social Economics* 23(9), 29-45.
33. Heywood B.H. and Watson R.T. eds. (1995) *Global Biodiversity Assessment*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
34. Hoffman S. (1989) *Duties Beyond Borders. On the Limits and Possibilities of Ethical International Politics*. Syracuse University Press, Syracuse.
35. Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (1989) *A World at Peace. Common Security in the Twenty-First Century ("Palme-Report")*, Stockholm.
36. Independent Commission on International Development Issues (North-South Commission) (1980) *North-South. A Programme for Survival (first "Brandt-Report")*. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
37. Independent Commission on International Development Issues (North-South Commission) (1983) *Common Crisis. North South Co-operation for World Recovery (second "Brandt-Report")*. Pan Books, London.
38. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change - IPCC (1996) *Climate Change 1995. Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate Change*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
39. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change - IPCC (2001) *Climate Change 2000. Report of Working Group I*, Shanghai, January 2001.
40. Jaenicke M., Weidner H. and Jorgens H. eds. (1996) *National Environmental Policies. A Comparative Study of Capacity-Building*. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, New York.
41. Joint Inspection Unit (1995) *Strengthening the United Nations System Capacity for Conflict Prevention (JIU/Rep/95/13)*, Geneva.
42. Kaul I., Grunberg I. and Stern M.A. eds. (1999) *Global Public Goods. International Co-operation in the 21st Century*. Oxford University Press, New York, Oxford.
43. Kenen P.B. ed. (1994) *Managing the World Economy. Fifty Years after Bretton Woods*, Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC.
44. Keohane R.O. (1984) *After Hegemony. Co-operation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, Institute for International Economics. Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J.
45. Keohane R.O. and Levy M. (1996) *Institutions for Environmental Aid. Pitfalls and Promise*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.
46. Kohl H. (1997) *Speech by Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, at the Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, 23. June, New York*.
47. Korton, D.C. (1990) *Getting to the 21st Century*. Kumarian Press, West Hartford, Conn.
48. Krasner S.D. ed. (1983) *International Regimes*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., London.

49. Levy M. (1993) European Acid Rain: The Power of Tote-Board Diplomacy, In: Haas P.M., Keohane R.O. and Levy M. eds. *The Effectiveness of International Environmental Institutions*, pp. 75-132.
50. Lyke J. and Fletcher S.R. (1992) *Deforestation. An Overview of Global Programmes and Agreements*, Washington, D.C: Congressional Research Service. Available on-line at: <http://www.cnie.org/nle/for-4html>. (April 19, 1998).
51. Miller L.H. (1990) *Global Order. Values and Power in International Politics*. Westview Press, San Francisco.
52. Miller M.A.L. (1995) *The Third World in Global Environmental Politics*. Rienner, Boulder, Col., London.
53. Myers N. (1993) *Ultimate Security*. W. W. Norton & Co., New York, London.
54. Ostrom E. (1991) *Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
55. Palmer G. (1992) New Ways to Make International Environmental Law. *American Journal of International Law* 86, 259-283.
56. Postiglione A. (1999) *The Global Demand for an International Court of the Environment*, Napoli: Ed. Scientifiche Italiane.
57. Raustiala K. (1997) States, NGOs, and International Environmental Institutions. *International Studies Quarterly* 41 (4), 719-740.
58. Reisman M. (1993) The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations. *American Journal of International Law* (January), 83-100.
59. Rest A. (1994) Need for an International Court for the Environment? *Environmental Policy and Law*, Vol. 24, No.4, 173-187.
60. Rittberger V. and Mayer P. eds. (1993) *Regime Theory and International Relations*. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
61. Rosbaud Ch. and Triffterer O. eds. (2000) *Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court*. Nomos, Baden-Baden.
62. Rosenau J.N. (1992) *The United Nations in a Turbulent World*. Rienner, Boulder, Col., London.
63. Rosenau J.N. and Czempiel E.O. (1992) *Governance without Government. Order and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
64. Ruggiero R. (1999) Opening Remarks to the High Level Symposium on Trade and the Environment, 15 March 1999, [www.wto.org/wto/hlms/dgenv.html](http://www.wto.org/wto/hlms/dgenv.html).
65. Runge C.F., Ortalo-Magne F. and Vande Kamp P. (1994) *Freer Trade, Protected Environment. Balancing Trade Liberalisation and Environmental Interests*. New York
66. Sachs W. ed. (1993) *Global Ecology. A New Arena of Political Conflict*. Zed Books, London.
67. Sand P.H. (1994) *Trusts for the Earth. New Financial Mechanisms for International Environmental Protection*. University of Hull Press, Hull.
68. Sands P.J. (1999) The Environment, Community and International Law. *Harvard International Law Journal* 30(2), 293-420.
69. Schellnhuber H.J. and Wenzel V. eds. (1998) *Earth System Analysis. Integrating Science for Sustainability*. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, New York.
70. Schipulle H.P. (1997) Das Rio-Paradigma der gemeinsamen aber differenzierten Verantwortung. *Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit* 38(8), 235-237.
71. Simonis U.E. ed. (1996a) *Weltumweltpolitik. Grundriss und Bausteine eines neuen Politikfeldes*. Edition Sigma, Berlin.
72. Simonis U.E. (1996b) Internationally Tradeable Emission Certificates. Linking Environmental Protection with Economic Development. *Economics* 53, 96-110.
73. South Centre (1996) *For a Strong and Democratic United Nations. A South Perspective on UN Reform*, Geneva.
74. South Commission (1990/1991) *The Challenge to the South ("Nyerere Report")*. Oxford University Press, New York, Oxford.
75. Speth J. G. (1996) Note Regarding Questions on UN Reform Proposals, unpublished document, dated 4 October 1996.
76. Speth J.G. (1998) Interview with Jens Martens, Bad Honnef, July 1998, <http://bicc.uni-bonn.de/sef/publications/news/no4/speth.html>
77. Streeten P. (1989) Global Institutions for an Interdependent World. *World Development* 14(9), 1349-1359.

78. Streeten P., Emmerij L. and Fortin C. (1992) *International Governance*. Institute of Development Studies. University of Sussex, Brighton.
79. The Independent Working Group on the Future of the United Nations (1995) *The United Nations in its Second Half-Century*, ("Qureshi / von Weizsacker-Report"). New York.
80. Tinbergen J., ed. (1976) *RIO - Reshaping the International Order*. Dutton, New York.
81. Touval S. (1994) Why the U.N. fails. *Foreign Affairs* 73(5), 44-57.
82. Union of International Associations (1999) *Yearbook of International Organisations*, Munich: K.G. Saur.
83. UNEP (1999) *GEO 2000. Global Environment Outlook*. Earthscan, New York, London.
84. United Nations Secretary General - UNSG (1992) *An Agenda for Peace. Preventive Diplomacy, Peace-Making and Peace-Keeping*. Report of the Secretary General, UN-Dok. A/47/277 - S/24111, 17 July 1992.
85. UNSG (1998) *Environment and Human Settlements*. Report of the Secretary General. Report to the 53. Session of the United Nations General Assembly. UN-Dok. A/53/463, 6 October 1998.
86. Victor D.G., Raustiala K. and Skolnikoff E.B. eds. (1998) *The Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments. Theory and Practice*. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., London.
87. Waltz K. N. (1959) *Man, the State, and War. A Theoretical Analysis*, New York.
88. Waltz K. N. (1979) *Theory of International Politics*. University of California Press, Berkeley, Calif.
89. Wapner P.(1997) *Governance in Global Civil Society*, In *Global Governance. Drawing Insights from the Environmental Experience*, ed. O. R. Young, pp. 65-84.
90. Werksman J. ed. (1996) *Greening International Institutions*. Earthscan, London.
91. World Conservation Monitoring Centre - WCMC (1994) *Priorities for Conserving Global Species Richness and Endemism*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
92. World Commission on Environment and Development - WCED - (1987) *Our Common Future*. Oxford University Press, New York, Oxford.
93. Young O.R. ed. (1997) *Global Governance. Drawing Insights from the Environmental Experience*. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., London.
94. Zaelke D. and Cameron J. (1990) *Global Warming and Climate Change. An Overview of the International Law and Policy*. *American University Journal of International Law and Policy* 5, 249-290.

---

**Professor Udo Simonis** is a research professor in environmental policy at the Science Centre Berlin and former member of the German Advisory Council on Global Environment Change. He studied economics at the University of Mainz and the University of Freiburg, and received a Ph.D. from the University of Kiel. His previous positions include Personal Advisor to the President of Zambia, Research Fellow at the University of Tokyo, Professor of Economics at the Technical University of Berlin, Visiting Professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong and Director of the International Institute for Environment and Society at the Science Centre Berlin. Professor Simonis is the Chairman of the Association of German Scientists and a member of the Advisory Committee of the Development and Peace Foundation.